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By Fredric I. Lederer 
Abstract  
The rapid adoption of courtroom technology is changing the nature of both litigation and adjudication. We are 
potentially on the road to a virtual courtroom, an adjudication in which none of the participants need be in the 
same place and which could result in the demise of the courtroom as we know it. This article reviews the nature of 
the burgeoning courtroom technology revolution, posits some of the critical legal, human, and policy questions 
that accompany it, and ponders the desirability of a "virtual courtroom."  
As trial reconvenes, the participants blink into existence on the computer monitors that supply the only 
commonality applicable to them. Judge, counsel, parties, witnesses, and jury appear in virtual form on each 
person's monitor. Necessary evidentiary foundations are laid by witnesses with distant counsel's questions; 
documentary evidence is not seen by the jury until received by the court. A real-time, multi-media record 
(transcript with digital audio, video, and evidence) is available instantly. Sidebar conferences are accomplished 
simply by switching the jury out of circuit. During the interim, the jurors can head for their kitchens or for restroom 
breaks. The public can follow the proceedings on the Internet. Should critical interlocutory motions be argued, the 
appellate court can directly monitor the proceedings.  
Or  
Having decided to fight his traffic ticket, Mark Calvin schedules his court appearance with the court's automated, 
World Wide Web docketing system. As the scheduled time approaches, he realizes that he won't make it to the 
local shopping center computer kiosk, so he uses his boss's office computer and joins the virtual courtroom. 
Judge and traffic officer appear in windows; each is in a different location. The officer and Calvin present their 
versions of events, illustrating any points with free hand sketches captured by their  
Introduction 
We are living in a technological age that is increasingly dependent upon computers and related information 
technology. Although still scarcely more than fledgling steps, commerce is increasingly Web-based, (3) political 
discussions occur in cyberspace, (4) and matters of acute national interest such as Independent Counsel Starr's 
report are released first via the Internet. (5) Although prime time media remains television based, the major 
networks, most notably CNN, have significant web presences. The nation is sufficiently computer dependent that 
the Year 2000 bug suffices for some to see the end of civilization. 
At the same time, the legal system is changing. Most of the nation's lawyers, judges, legal administrators, and 
support personnel have long ago adopted word processing, electronic legal research, time and billing programs 
and, increasingly, varying forms of case management software. Electronic filing, already in use in a number of 
courts, is a topic of discussion in numerous jurisdictions. In Los Angeles and Indianapolis, motorists can pay their 
traffic fines by dialing in to Internet sites and providing credit card information. (6) Some California offenders can 
go to traffic school on-line. (7) There is even a virtual law firm. (8) 
Yet, until recently, technology largely sidestepped the courtroom. Such technology as was present usually came in
the form of ad hoc, case-specific hardware that was brought into the courtroom for use in a single case and was 
later removed. Although ad hoc technology use is still common, albeit even frequent, the current trend is toward 
integrated high technology courtrooms. Depending upon definition, as of April 1998, the Courtroom 21 Project had 
verified eight qualifying state facilities and approximately thirty-two federal ones. More have come on line since 
then. 
The advent of high technology courtrooms and, in Australia, investigatory hearing rooms, (9) has raised the 
question of "virtual trials." If we assume, as we shall later in this article, that a "virtual trial" is a trial in which all the 
participants and all "information," (i.e., evidence, opening statements, closing arguments, and, in jury trials, 
instructions) are conveyed in real-time electronically to each other as appropriate, a virtual trial, and the virtual 
courtroom necessary to support it, are still somewhere in the future. Yet, if by "virtual" one means that significant 
portions of the evidence, including remote witness testimony, is conveyed electronically, such trials and 
courtrooms are in fact already here. 
The common characteristic of all high technology courtrooms is the capability to present evidence electronically, 
which can be transmitted to anywhere in the world. Further, an increasing number of courtrooms include the 
capability for remote, two-way testimony via video- conferencing. (10) Indeed as of April, 1998, the Administrative 
Office of the United States Court reported that at least thirty-four federal district courts, encompassing sixty 
separate locations, are or will soon be equipped for video- conferencing. (11) At least twenty-nine states use or 
authorize videoconferencing for various proceedings, (12) and a few have implemented remote, forensic expert 
laboratory testimony. (13) Even appellate courts are using videoconferencing. The United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Second, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits use videoconferencing for oral arguments, (14) 
and in United States v. Salazar, (15) the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces heard a case in the 
Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom with two of the court's five judges appearing via videoconferencing 
from different states.  
Given that judges, counsel, and witnesses need not be in the same location (16), the possibility of trials in which 
no physical commonality is present is obvious -- and real. (17) Today's technology is such that we are 
unintentionally on the road to at least the capability for, if not the actuality of, virtual trials and virtual courtrooms. 
(18) Whether the result is a desirable destination, an unfortunate detour, or a one-way trip to disaster is far from 
clear. What is clear is that we are on our way.  
This article reviews the technology that is pointing us in the direction of virtual trials and courtrooms and then 
ponders the legal, human, and policy questions raised by that possibility. The article is informed by the experience 
and views of a number of technologically pioneering jurists and court administrators, who were interviewed in 
preparation for writing it, as well as the insights gathered by the Courtroom 21 Project staff over a six-year period. 
The article also includes the tentative conclusions of the first Courtroom 21 International Working Conference on 
Technology Augmented Litigation. As has been oft expressed in the Courtroom 21 Project, this article assumes 
that technology should be only a means to an end and not an end unto itself. The question then is not what we 
can do with the technological options available to us, but rather for what purposes may we wish to use technology.
We will address initially the current courtroom technologies that provide the foundation for virtual courtrooms, 
pause to review the lessons of today's integrated high technology courtrooms, and then move to a consideration 
of what may be tomorrow's virtual courtrooms. 
First, the "Paradigm" 
High technology courtrooms and technology augmented litigation are reflections of the understood, but rarely 
voiced, nature of legal practice. Legal practice, especially litigation and adjudication, is a highly sophisticated form 
of information management. 
The courtroom is a place of adjudication, but it is also an information hub. Outside information is assembled, 
sorted, and brought into the courtroom for presentation. Once presented, various theories of interpretation are 
argued to the fact finder who then analyzes the data according to prescribed rules (determined by the judge 
through research, analysis, and interpretation), and determines a verdict and result. That result, often with 
collateral consequences, is then transmitted throughout the legal system as necessary. The courtroom is thus the 
center of a complex system of information exchange and management. (19) 
Ultimately, it is the fact that lawyers and judges deal continuously with "data" that impels high technology 
courtrooms and which makes virtual courtrooms possible.  
The Foundation for the Virtual Courtroom: Today's Developing Technologies 
Case Management, Electronic Filing and Related Information 
The courtroom does not exist in a vacuum. The cases that are tried in the courtroom begin with the filing of 
pleadings, often continue with motions and supporting documents, and only finally arrive in the courtroom 
complete with often copious evidence.  
Modern case management requires systems that help courthouse personnel manage the flow of cases. Cases 
must be kept current and case information must be routed to a variety of critical administrative personnel and 
judges. (20) Managing the case effectively requires managing the information that gives rise to the case. In 
traditional terms that requires storing and routing the originals and copies of what can be huge amounts of paper, 
especially in a major urban courthouse. If only to achieve the largest money and time economies possible, one 
can expect court administrators to seek more efficient control over paper by reducing it to electronic data. This 
gives rise to electronic filing. 
In its most basic form, electronic filing, now being experimented with around the nation, (21) either permits or 
requires that pleadings be sent electronically to the court. Pragmatically, a good system will also provide for the 
dispatch of copies to all other necessary parties. (22) Although electronic mail easily permits the simple 
communication of information it is entirely inadequate from a systemic point of view. From the court's perspective, 
efficiency requires that case name, parties, attorneys, and other data be supplied to the court in an identifiable 
manner that permits the court to capture that specific information for case management purposes. At the same 
time, current court rules require that the legal documents themselves be submitted in highly specific formats. 
Appellate rules, for example, may mandate fonts, type sizes and set page limits. One can assume that nearly all 
material written by lawyers is produced using computers. Unfortunately, each software package is unique, and 
none of the available options can be converted perfectly into another's format. Accordingly, any electronic filing 
system must accommodate the differing formats. Even if this is done successfully, one must then cope with two 
critical complications: some documents that must be filed were not produced using a computer and must therefore
be converted into an electronic image, and pro se litigants cannot be expected to file personally by computer.  
In reality, the electronic filing situation is more complicated. Not all lawyers use computers, and a perfect 
electronic filing system must either require the largest degree of such filings possible, by coercing the lawyers to 
participate electronically, or cope adequately with what could be a significant amount of paper. Once electronic 
information measures are implemented, the likely court solution is to take any paper that is traditionally filed and 
have the court turn it into electronic data. Members of the public without electronic access must then be assisted 
by court staff when they wish to take advantage of their right to public access to the filed materials. 
The collateral consequences of electronic case management, filing, and related systems are of great potential 
importance. Scheduling a hearing, for example, will require resort to one or more calendars. The judge's calendar 
will be critical, but if the judge isn't assigned permanently to a given courtroom, a courthouse calendar will be 
required as well. At the same time, efficient scheduling should involve access to all other hearings involving the 
same counsel. (23) At the very least, these needs impel judicial access to more sources of scheduling information,
and such access should be available from both chambers and the bench. When electronic filing is implemented as
well, calendaring information is augmented by the actual pleading and associated legal documents, all in 
electronic format. Once this information is available and electronically accessible there is little or no reason to limit 
it to court personnel. Trials are open to the public, and the status of filed cases, including scheduled public 
hearings, are matters of public and media interest. Further, the content of filings can be of enormous interest to 
other parties and the public. This is especially true of litigation involving many parties such as the breast implant 
and tobacco cases. Once the basic information is available, absent special circumstances such as sealed filings, 
there is little reason not to make it generally available, and the World Wide Web has provided a simple mechanism
for doing so. (24) The immediate, world-wide, electronic access to fundamental scheduling information, 
accompanied by the images of the actual documents, creates a virtual clerk's office, and more. For example, 
Delaware's Chancery Court is going online. By the end of the year, lawyers, judges and consumers should be able
to dial up the business court's Internet Web site to get copies of lawsuits, briefs, and settlement documents. (25) 
Should the judge respond to pleadings with electronic court orders without in-person hearings, a virtual pretrial 
court session exists as well. 
The currently evolving virtual clerk's office clearly permits faster, more efficient, and cheaper operation. Physical 
storage costs can be almost entirely eliminated and transmission and notification times are nullified by electronics. 
At the same time, public access becomes truly meaningful, largely for the first time. Unfortunately, these 
improvements come at some cost. Technology adoption and training expenses are significant, especially if the 
number of computer illiterate court and bar personnel is substantial. Once embarked on the technological roller 
coaster, the court will almost certainly find itself faced with questions of periodic upgrading of both software and 
hardware, and the risk of having one or more of its systems "orphaned" as the cut-throat world of technology 
competition eliminates companies. Compatibility may be a major problem, not only among different systems -- will 
lawyers have to deal with different filing systems for each court -- but also within the court if later upgrades prove 
to be incompatible with prior versions of the software. The impact on the public is far from trivial as well. Although 
those people who have access to computers, the Internet, and computer skills will have immediate access to what 
is taking place in their courts, those without such advantages will be dependant on the clerk's staff, which is, 
ironically, the present situation. (26) One other result will occur, however -- a sharp change in the effective privacy 
of court documents and court information. 
The general public has always had legal access to court records dealing with title to real property. Any interested 
person can check the status of any parcel of real estate, including any associated liens. As a practical matter, 
however, this right has been of little value to most. Even if they were aware of the fact that such records exist and 
are public, they lack the knowledge of how to find specific records. Few would bother to ask the clerk's assistance 
without special reason. Electronic data has changed the situation, however. Some years ago LEXIS began to 
carry such records as part of its database. It took only seconds for me to obtain a description of a friend's house 
on the other side of the United States, along with a property tax valuation; I even discovered other real estate 
owned by my friend of which I was unaware. Similarly, at least one newspaper reporter has confidentially reported 
to me the ability to access court database information of allegations that members of the public had committed 
highly disagreeable offenses. Before electronic records were made, this information existed but was effectively 
impossible to search. Now, not only do you not need to travel to the courthouse, Internet searches can retrieve the
data almost immediately, and you do not need specialized legal knowledge to obtain it. Electronic court 
information thus makes real and important changes in the actual degree of privacy that exists in the court process,
changes that diminish individual privacy. This result likely would be replicated in the event of easily accessible 
virtual trials. Some years ago, Art Buchwald wrote a satirical column (27) in which a fictional commuter rail 
passenger refused to pay for a ticket because his train car was not heated or clean. The conductor summoned the
police and the commuter was forced to defend himself in court. The trial was televised. The trial was brief and the 
commuter was acquitted of disturbing the peace. Subsequently, the commuter found that a surprisingly large 
number of people had viewed some or all of his case, but that few remembered the details. Instead, they all 
ascribed major criminal violations to him, eventually resulting in the loss of his job and an offer extended to him as 
an "ex con." Although today's significantly increased media coverage of trials calls into question Buchwald's 
tongue-in-cheek view of the impact of television and the average citizen's perception and memory, his basic 
premise of a change in individual privacy seems sound. Like court records, most trials are effectively private; Court
TV and the other television stations and networks have limited carrying capacity. Today's easy data accessibility 
suggests that virtual trials which could be followed at home via Web-television or computer might replicate the 
colonial period in which the general public had easy access to cases and regularly attended trials, if only for 
entertainment. 
Legal Briefs and Other Legal Materials 
Legal research is a critical component of any lawyer's practice, and it is increasingly unthinkable that American 
lawyers could function successfully without access to electronic legal materials. LEXIS and Westlaw are 
mainstays for most lawyers. They have brought to attorneys vast and ever current libraries available originally 
through dial-up telephone connection and now via the Internet. Similar materials, albeit not as current, are 
available in CD-ROM publications. Firms such as Matthew Bender supply sophisticated electronic form books on 
disk that further automate legal practice. 
Access to electronic legal materials has changed the nature of law practice. It has created virtual law libraries and,
through on-line access, has hastened the advent of the virtual law office, one which exists wherever the lawyer 
may happen to be. Within the high technology courtroom, counsel and judge have immediate electronic access to 
nearly all legal authorities. Further, and critically, when the courtroom is properly equipped, counsel and judge 
may display their authorities to each other as an important adjunct to legal argument. 
Given the increasingly electronic nature of legal materials, it should be no surprise that lawyers are now creating 
electronic, multi-media legal briefs. The famous Fish &amp; Richardson Yukiyo appellate brief (28) was a multi-
media CD-ROM brief that contained, on one disk, counsels' brief, hypertext-linked legal authorities, transcript, and 
evidence. The brief also included all of the necessary documents one would expect in the Appendices, along with 
diagrams, video clips, and part of a video deposition, with audio. Although the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit granted the opponent's motion to strike the CD-ROM in favor of a traditional presentation, the 
Court laid out procedures for later high technology briefs, and such have been received. (29) Companies such as 
West, Lexis, and Pubnetics, among others, now produce or assist in the productions of such briefs. 
The advent of electronic legal briefs carries at least three significant implications. The first is that appellate practice
may be changing. These briefs are far more comprehensive than their traditional equivalents, and, if used in an 
appropriately wired courtroom, they permit extraordinary electronic visual interchange of legal authority among 
judges and counsel. (30) The second implication stems from economics. Electronic appellate briefs are in part 
compilations of materials generated at or presented during trial. To ensure the most inexpensive preparation 
possible, those underlying trial matters, including transcript and evidence, should originate at trial as digital 
information so that the "data" can be reproduced quickly and cheaply in the brief. Lastly, these briefs can be filed, 
exchanged, and presented electronically, laying the ground work for a virtual appellate courtroom.  
Court record 
Courts of record in the United States require verbatim records of their proceedings. In general terms, courts can 
be divided between those which use stenographic or stenomask court reporters to generate the record and those 
which use some form of electronic voice recording. The record is of importance to both trial and appellate courts 
and to the attorneys and parties involved. (31)  
Recent developments in court record technology show how quickly we are developing the infrastructure 
necessary to a virtual trial. 
Most court reporters have been using modern technology for many years, generating computer assisted 
transcription. The most capable of court reporters can generate "real-time," transcript, a contemporaneous, 
substantially accurate rough draft of the transcript that is made available to judge and counsel on their personal 
computers. Until recently, only stenographic reporters could produce such a transcript. In 1997, a Louisiana 
company, Audioscribe, produced the first trainable, speech recognition, real-time system which permits 
stenomask reporters to produce real-time transcript, albeit at a level not yet equal to better stenographic 
reporters. Real-time is inherently digital. Transcript results when the court reporter's key presses or voice finds a 
match in the computer's database; absent such a match, symbols which can later be translated are produced. 
Because the transcript is electronic, it can be transmitted over telephone lines or, as is increasingly done, can be 
published to the web for real-time viewing. 
The alternative to court reporter-produced transcripts is electronic recording: audio or audio/video. Although 
analog tape-recorded audio is the most inexpensive recording technology, more useful digital audio is now 
beginning to replace the older technology. Digital audio has significant improvements over analog, including 
easier storage and, often, text annotations that can be used as a limited search index. (32) Like real-time, the 
digital nature of the audio permits transmission to remote locations, either via ISDN or other heavy bandwidth 
connections, or via the Web. Video records, traditionally videotaped proceedings, have generated more 
comprehensive electronic records because they include picture and sound; indeed electronic recording inherently 
supplies information to an appellate court that is not available though a traditional transcript alone. (33) However, 
video records have not generally been accepted as direct court transcripts in any state other than Kentucky. (34) 
Accordingly, when a party wishes to appeal, the video record, as is also the case with an analog or digital audio 
record, must be transcribed. (35) 
The same technology that is used to make the court record is often used before trial for discovery purposes. 
Videotaped depositions have been used for many years in the courtroom either in lieu of in-court testimony or for 
impeachment of a witness. Combining digital audio and video with a computer-assisted transcript produces a 
synchronized, multi-media transcript. When such a deposition is played in court, ordinarily from a CD-ROM disk, 
counsel can present the audio, video and scrolling electronic text transcript. When published to the World Wide 
Web, the same technology provides a comprehensive real-time record. This virtual "deposition attendance" is an 
important marker on the road to the digital courtroom. 
The same technology that permits multimedia depositions also can be used to create multi-media court records. 
Because digital video takes up a huge amount of electronic storage space, such a court record has not really 
been commercially feasible - and the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom is believed to be the only 
courtroom in the world that has a functioning multi-media court record system that combines audio, video, and 
synchronized real-time transcript. Changing technology, however, should address this in the next few years. (36) 
At the same time, Internet and network technology is quickly changing our expectations of data access and 
availability. Working with an Australian company, the Courtroom 21 Project is in the process of completing a 
system which combines the reporter's real-time transcript with digital audio, (37) along with all evidence, and 
relevant case management and electronic filing data, thus providing an immediate, electronically disseminated 
record. 
In the past, the availability of a comprehensive court record that includes voice inflections and body language has 
raised questions of how the appellate system might be affected. Traditionally, the appellate courts give deference 
to the evaluation of demeanor evidence by the trial court. (38) A comprehensive multi-media record necessarily 
forces one to ask whether appeals might become in effect de novo appeals. (39) Although the sheer number of 
cases alone argues against this result, it can hardly be gainsaid that it is likely that an appellate court would feel 
far freer in its review if it had available nearly everything that had happened below. (40) Although concern about 
the scope of appellate review is valid and perhaps even of increasing importance, the fact of such an electronic 
record also emphasizes our ability to take legal events that occur during trial and instantly record and transmit 
them. Accordingly, if all evidence can be given electronically , the core components of a virtual trial are present. 
Evidence and Information Presentation 
In general 
Litigation is, of course, a dispute between or among parties. Resolution of that dispute requires that the parties, 
usually through counsel, prove necessary relevant facts and then persuade the fact finder, judge or jury that when 
the applicable law is applied to the facts, a verdict in their favor should result. To prove the appropriate facts, 
counsel present evidence. Evidence normally consists of witness testimony and actions, (41) documents, charts, 
photographs or other images, and physical objects. When counsel make opening statements or closing 
arguments they technically do not present evidence. Instead they can be viewed as presenting information to the 
judge and jury, information, which like evidence, consists of verbal statements often supplemented by use of 
documents, charts, photographs or other images, and physical objects. Perhaps the core element that 
characterizes technology-augmented litigation and high tech courtrooms is the use of technology to present 
evidence and counsel-originated information. The effect of electronically-displayed evidence can be seen in 
human terms in recent Australian litigation: 
Downtown at 55 King Street, two of Victoria's biggest ever civil trials are in full swing on adjoining floors of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal building, specially leased for the purpose by the Supreme Court. 
Both cases are engaging in documentary warfare on an epic scale, but ride the lift from one floor to another and 
the picture is strikingly different. 
On the first floor, the court is wading knee deep through the paper trial tracking the collapse of the Pyramid 
Building Society. 
The courtroom is crowded with shelves overflowing with files - 500 per party. Every time a document is mentioned 
there's a mad scurry as everyone looks through shelves and leafs through pages looking for the right piece of 
paper. 
Downstairs, where investors in the failed Estate Mortgage are trying to win back some of the $ 1 billion lost by the 
company in the eighties, the atmosphere is strangely serene for a court ploughing its way through more than 
30,000 documents (pared down from the original 1.5 million). 
The room is dominated by computers, rows and rows of them. The smattering of files barely takes up a single 
shelf. The only sound punctuating the drone of the presenter is the occasional click of a mouse button. (42) 
Technology can be installed temporarily for a specific trial or permanently in an integrated, high technology 
courtroom. Most technology augmented evidence and information presentation originates with document 
cameras, computers, and computer white boards. (43) Evidence and information can be displayed on large 
television screens, jury monitors, front or rear projection screens, or any combination thereof. 
Although the distinction is an uneasy one, as will be seen herein, we sometimes can legitimately separate the 
electronic display of evidence and information from questions surrounding the use of electronic evidence per se. 
The most commonplace, and simple, way of presenting material in court via technology is to use a document 
camera. Often known under the name of the two most common vendors, Elmo and DOAR (Communicator), a 
document camera is simply a vertically mounted TV camera aimed down at a flat surface. The lawyer puts a 
photo, document, or object on the surface, and the camera instantly displays the image on the television(s) or 
monitor(s) to which it is attached. The camera has two buttons permitting easy and fast closeups. . . . 
A document camera is normally connected to one or more televisions by a simple cable. However, some vendors 
often an RF (radio frequency) add-on that permits the camera to transmit its information to a TV connected 
receiver without wires. This capability can be critical in convincing a judge to permit counsel to bring the 
equipment into the courtroom. 
When a person using the basic document camera wishes to point to an area or point under the camera, he or she 
can do so with a pointer, pen or pencil, or a finger. An electronic pointer can be added, however. A device such as 
a DOAR Illustrator or a "Beckler" permits the use of a light pen on a pad or on an attached computer monitor 
image. .. . (44) 
In its simplest form the document camera converts documents and other physical images and objects into 
television or computer images. Through the use of a document camera coupled to appropriate display devices, 
counsel can display larger-than-life images immediately, increasing comprehension and sharply decreasing the 
time necessary to acquaint a jury with the evidence. Further, as the document camera is portable, it can be 
transported among courtrooms as necessary.  
Although the document camera is perhaps the most basic form of electronic evidence presentation, in most 
respects it is symbolic of all other forms of high tech evidence display. I have elsewhere suggested that 
"Electronically produced evidence can be defined as that evidence which originates as digital material or which is, 
regardless of origin, produced in court solely as digital material." (45) If the image produced by the document 
camera is what is offered in evidence, rather than, for example, the paper document placed under the document 
camera, there is no difference between the perceived evidence and evidence that originated in digital form. (46) 
Utility 
Electronically-produced evidence that is displayed on a television or computer monitor is perceived as an 
electronic image. It is also amenable to electronic transmission, storage, and, if need be, replay. Limited 
Courtroom 21 Project experimental work shows that jurors are highly satisfied by the electronic display of 
documents. (47) Indeed our experimental laboratory trials tell us that jurors want evidence to be presented visually
to the greatest degree possible. Although they proclaim no preference for electronic visuals over traditional charts, 
photos, and the like, much of today's exhibits can best be presented electronically.  
Judges who preside over high tech courtrooms invariably are proponents of the technology and claim that in 
addition to speeding trials, the technology provides better justice because it increases juror comprehension. 
Indeed, in 1998 The Judicial Conference Committee On Automation and Technology released the results of their 
assessment of certain technologies used in federal courts. On video evidence presentation, defined as 
simultaneous display of evidence to judge, jury, and court via individual monitors, 83% of judges surveyed felt the 
technology helped them manage court proceedings better and 90% of jurors surveyed felt that they were able to 
see evidence clearly, follow attorney presentations, and that the video display was an easier way to present 
certain evidence. (48)  
Anecdotal evidence in this area point to two reasons for better comprehension on the part of jurors: 1) the use of 
video evidence presentation makes cases more lively and engages the jury more and, 2) display on individual 
monitors allows jurors to read at their own speed without embarrassment. (49) Our own experience in Courtroom 
21 laboratory trials bears this out. In our surveys, jurors preferred visual presentation of evidence on individual jury
monitors. 
Though better comprehension by jurors is surely a benefit to attorneys, some lawyers have pointed out other 
benefits to using video evidence presentation systems. Time that might normally be spent sifting through evidence
and deciding what will go into evidence books is saved since everything can easily be stored and organized on a 
CD-ROM. An attorney might also look more organized and competent to a jury when carrying a CD-ROM into 
court and clicking through exhibits rather than repeatedly digging through piles of paper. (50) 
Anecdotal evidence from the United States and Australia also suggests that trials can be shortened by at least 25 
to 25% by the use of electronically-presented evidence. Yet, efficiency is not the primary goal of our legal system -
- hopefully justice is. Justice requires as accurate a result as possible.  
A best evidence problem? 
Electronic images of evidence that began as or which exist as non-digital physical evidence are not the same as 
the image. "Electronic visual images of original non-digital evidence nearly always differ in some particulars from 
the; 'hard-copy;' originals. Current technology is such that even if a totally accurate image of the original is made 
or captured, the displayed image will differ in color and resolution." (51) These differences are rarely of 
significance, however. In most circumstances the color balance difference between the paper document and the 
electronic image used in court is irrelevant; the information content of the text is what is important. (52) If the 
electronic display of evidence does not inherently raise troubling concerns, we must ask whether the use of 
electronic evidence and information is itself problematic. 
Electronic evidence usually consists of images of documents, most frequently electronically scanned documents, 
photographic or other visual images, computer produced animations, and panoramic or 360 degree photographs. 
(53) Audio and video recordings are also of potential value, and as previously noted, we are increasingly using 
media-media depositions at trial.  
Alteration and fabrication 
The most frequently raised question concerning electronic evidence is the possibility of alteration through 
undetectable digital skullduggery. To the best of our knowledge this is technically possible. Whether it is or should 
be a real concern is by no means clear.  
Given sufficient funds and time we believe that the technology exists to permit at least a reasonable possibility of 
altered or totally fabricated electronic evidence, be it still images, digital audio, or even digital video. Much the 
same could be true of the possibility of fabrication of traditional evidence, however. It is not clear that the risk of 
seamless electronic forgery is substantially different from the risk of a document prepared by a highly skillful forger
-- at least once we accept that such a thing is possible. The evidentiary system's authentication demands are 
relatively slight and generally are met simply by the foundational testimony of a "witness with knowledge." (54) 
What is supposed to suffice to save us from forgery are not evidentiary rules so much as the adversary system's 
ability to meet evidence with credible adverse evidence, including witness testimony. (55) What the risk of 
alteration does suggest is the need for early pretrial discovery and disclosure of electronic evidence. (56) 
Unfair prejudice 
Opening statements and closing arguments lend themselves to use of key pieces of evidence, often illuminated by
counsel's own interpretation of their meaning. Counsel thus are likely to show evidentiary images to the judge or 
jury. In addition, as counsel are trying to make clear and persuasive points, counsel may wish to use computer-
based presentation media, "slide shows" (57) Electronic slides permit the creative use of electronic text points, 
often enriched by clip art images, charts or photographs. (58) Such slides raise the possibility of intentional 
insertion of "visual bias," the equivalent of semantically "loading" the spoken or written message with words 
carefully chosen to create a specific psychological reaction. In one early Courtroom 21 Project experiment, 
plaintiff's counsel used a slide show that was designed to bias jurors against the defense. In a civil wrongful death 
case in which the plaintiff had died in a hotel fire, plaintiff's slides were set against an angry crimson backdrop and 
designed , among other matters, to subtly suggest a tombstone inscription. The presiding judge, Judge Roger 
Strand, of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, quickly sustained the defense objection. Of 
greater interest, however, was the jury's reaction. When surveyed after the laboratory trial, the jury reported easy 
recognition of counsel's intent and a significant degree of anger at the effort.  
That it is possible to slant exhibits or slides through careful use of text, fonts, colors, and images is hardly news. 
The law has long been concerned with evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Whether slide shows or computer 
animation, the same concerns and rules apply to electronic media as to gruesome photographs of murder victims. 
That the jury in our experiment also reacted adversely to counsel's intent to create bias is reassuring; such 
attempts may always backfire, whether high tech or not. 
No one can confidently predict that electronically produced or displayed evidence will be trouble free. More 
accurately, the most one apparently can hope for is that no new problems will be created, just the same old 
problems in new guises. But, if electronic evidence and information are not especially problematic, the fact that we
can present evidence usefully and successfully by electronic means unavoidably methods that evidence can be 
presented in a virtual courtroom. 
Jury deliberations 
Electronic marking of a video image is transitory. No record of it exists after the image is altered or erased. When 
the image needs to shown to a jury again or put in the appellate record, the system should be connected to a 
video printer and appropriate images printed as the image is changed. This suggests a greater and more troubling 
concern: how does the jury deal with electronic evidence during deliberations? Anecdotal reports from visitors to 
the Courtroom 21 Project suggest that at present when a jury wishes to review technology presented evidence, it 
is most often returned to the courtroom and the evidence replayed there. Sometimes, especially if the technology 
is straightforward, a court officer plays the evidence in the jury room. High technology courtrooms raise the 
troubling question of how the jury should review the full panoply of technology-dependent evidence. At present 
there is no adequate answer to this. Specific pieces of evidence are not troublesome, but in a case with a real-
time transcript, and hundreds or thousands of images, perhaps augmented by recordings of remote testimony, the 
problem is acute. One component of the problem is technical: we must ensure that the jury receives only admitted 
evidence. The other is a combined matter of people and technology. How can we ensure that jurors can easily find
and play the necessary evidence when they may be functionally illiterate, let alone computer illiterate? Another, 
more substantial question, also presents itself. Jurors now have only limited access to the evidence. What would 
happen if they could recall and debate all of the evidence presented in the case? Would a verdict result? Would it 
take less or more time? Would deliberations be improved? There are no answers to these questions at this time, 
experimental work is critically needed in the area. 
Remote Witness Testimony 
Our discussion of electronically presented evidence is incomplete. Witness testimony is a critical component in 
most trials, and our evidentiary and information discussion did not address the presentation of live witness 
testimony. A virtual trial is not possible without that capability. 
Video depositions have been commonplace in courts for some years (59). Judge McCrystal experimented in Ohio 
years ago with videotaping testimony and then playing the edited tapes to the jury in lieu of live testimony. (60) 
Recorded testimony lacks, however, the immediacy of live testimony and deprives us of the ability to use 
testimony from witnesses who are not in the courtroom. Videoconferencing supplies that capability, and 
videoconferencing for remote first 
appearances and arraignment has become commonplace throughout the state courts. (61) Indeed, at least 
twenty-nine states use or authorize videoconferencing for various proceedings. (62)  
Satellite-based videoconferencing supplies near perfect audio and video but is too expensive and inaccessible. 
(63) Current ISDN (high capacity data line) "dial-up" videoconferencing permits relatively inexpensive, two-way, 
high-quality remote testimony from anywhere in the world.  
As implemented in the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom, a 40 inch diagonal SONY TV/monitor has 
been installed immediately behind the witness stand. When remote testimony is to be taken, the participants in the
courtroom see the life-size image of the remote witness The remote witness sees a multi-frame TV image of four 
specific portions of the courtroom, the speaker, and a comprehensive image of the entire courtroom. The witness 
can effectively see everything. And, of course there is two-way audio. Direct and cross-examination proceed as 
customary. Evidence can be displayed electronically via document cameras, computers, or faxed. (64)  
Such testimony is not perfect. Short audio delays that are inherent in the technology prohibit the instant 
interruptions common in ordinary conversation. Although video resolution and quality are good, extremely rapid 
movement may not reproduce properly. (65) Notwithstanding these constraints, Courtroom 21 Project 
experimental use indicates that videoconferencing is highly effective. Four experiments have indicated that jurors 
perceive remote witnesses just as they perceive in-court witnesses, neither better nor worse. However, we lack 
any experimental evidence that might indicate whether remote witnesses are more or less likely to tell the truth 
than in-court witnesses. There are also significant problems with effective administration of the oath; absent a 
treaty or special statute, cross-jurisdictional perjury may not be subject to prosecution. (66) Further, transmission 
from commercial videoconferencing centers or business surroundings lacks the traditional judicial surroundings 
thought to convey the seriousness of court testimony. Notwithstanding this, remote testimony is expanding rapidly.
(67) Begun primarily in Australia's federal court, (68) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now expressly provide 
for its use. 
In every trial, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open court, unless a federal law, these rules, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. The court may, for 
good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presentation of 
testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location. (69) 
Insofar as criminal cases are concerned the United States Supreme Court has accepted when necessary child
witness testimony via one-way video. (70) In what is almost certainly a major harbinger of the future, the Florida 
Supreme Court has sustained a robbery conviction based largely upon the two-way video testimony of 
complainants testifying from Argentina. (71)  
The Court decided that in order for the testimony to be received despite Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
limits "the procedure must (1) be justified, on a case-specific finding, based on important state interests, public 
policies, or necessities of the case and (2) must satisfy the other three elements of confrontation--oath, cross-
examination, and observation of the witness's demeanor." (72) Having decided to sustain the conviction, the Court
added as a matter of policy,  
We are mindful of the possible difficulty in determining when the satellite procedure should be employed. We are 
also aware of the possibility that such a procedure can be abused. Therefore, we are establishing the following 
guidelines to aid in making this decision. The determination is not simply a mathematical calculation, based on the 
number of alleged public policy interests or state interests. Rather, the proper approach for determining when the 
satellite procedure is appropriate involves a finding similar to that of rule 3.190(j) of the Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 3.190(j) provides the circumstances under which and the procedure by which a party can take a 
deposition to perpetuate testimony for those witnesses that are found to be unavailable. . . . 
Thus, in all future criminal cases where one of the parties makes a motion to present testimony via satellite 
transmission, it is incumbent upon the party bringing the motion to (1) verify or support by the affidavits of credible 
persons that a prospective witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court or may be unable to 
attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing and (2) establish that the witness's testimony is material 
and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Upon such a showing, the trial judge shall allow for the satellite 
procedure.  
. . . However, some important caveats exist in regards to the oath, cross-examination, and observation of the 
witness's demeanor. First, an oath is only effective if the witness can be subjected to prosecution for perjury upon 
making a knowingly false statement. . . . To ensure that the possibility of perjury is not an empty threat for those 
witnesses that testify via satellite from outside the United States, it must be established that there exists an 
extradition treaty between the witness's country and the United States, and that such a treaty permits extradition 
for the crime of perjury. . . .  
We also acknowledge that possible audio and visual problems can develop with satellite transmission. It is 
incumbent upon the trial judge to monitor such problems and to halt the procedure if these problems threaten the 
reliability of the cross-examination or the observation of the witness's demeanor. (73) 
Harrell demonstrates that in Florida the fundamental concept of remote testimony in criminal cases has been 
accepted. The decision of the United States Supreme Court to refuse to grant certiorari (74) has no precedential 
impact, of course. The absence of review suggests however either that the Court has no significant problem with 
the Harrell result or wishes further development of the practice and law before ruling on the procedure. 
That use of this technology will increase can be seen simply by looking at the nature of current installations. The 
one area of substantial American use of videoconferencing has been remote first appearances or arraignments in 
criminal cases. (75) No one has made, to the best of our knowledge, an accurate inventory of the number of 
courts using such systems. The number of installations is, however, at least in the hundreds -- if not far greater. At 
the same time, the federal courts have experimented with remote appearances by incarcerated § 1983 plaintiffs. 
(76) It was only to be expected that the companies selling these systems would attempt to expand their sales via 
systems designed for other uses, and that is now occurring. Jefferson Audio Video, Inc., for example, has installed
remote witness testimony locations from which police forensic chemists can testify. During the 1998 Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration Conference in Melbourne, the State of Victoria demonstrated a two-way 
connection to its forensic laboratory, illustrating how a forensic chemist, in a lab setting, could testify without 
coming to court. At the same time, the large number of courts and jurisdictions that have invested heavily in this 
technology are already seeking additional uses to justify their capital investment. (77)  
Remote appearances by judges, counsel, and others 
The courts are using videoconferencing for far more than witness testimony. Police,for example, have sought 
arrest warrants by two-way television. (78) The courts have shown a greater interest, however, in remote 
appearances by counsel and judges, an area now developing rapidly. 
The Second Circuit (79) has provided remote locations for counsel appearances. The Court first experimented 
with live, remote video oral argument in a case in October, 1996. The Court then formally adopted remote video 
oral argument in the Spring of 1997 and established video links in four locations (Albany, Mineola, and Rochester, 
New York and Hartford, Connecticut). The Second Circuit encompasses New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, 
and the Court sits in Manhattan, so the advent of remote oral argument has proved a significant benefit to 
attorneys who could travel all day for a ten-minute argument before the Court. (80) The circuit executive has noted
that the judges and most attorneys do not feel there is an advantage to appearing in person in the Court. (81) 
Victoria, Australia, has shown the ability in an emergency to bring in a substitute judge via videoconferencing from 
hundreds of miles away within an hour when the scheduled judge was forced from the bench by family necessity. 
(82) The Courtroom 21 Project hosted the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on March 15, 
1996. The Court heard United States v. Salazar (83) in the McGlothlin Courtroom, with two of its five judges 
appearing by separate videoconferencing systems.  
The use of technology to assist those with hearing, vision, mobility or other problems is of particular importance. 
Internet-based videoconferencing proved to be critical in one such case. Relying on the decisions in Harrell, supra 
and United States v. Gigante, (84) and taking them a step further, a New Jersey Superior Court judge granted a 
plaintiff's application to testify and observe the trial from his apartment via a videoconferencing link over the 
Internet. The plaintiff, who is paralyzed from the neck down and breathes with the aid of a respirator, stated that 
he was too weak to travel from Chicago to New Jersey for his medical malpractice suit against several New 
Jersey doctors and that the cost and time involved in enabling him to travel would be prohibitive. The judge 
agreed, and to allay the defense attorneys' fears that the plaintiff could be coached in his testimony, he appointed 
a retired judge to monitor the plaintiff in his apartment during the proceedings. In a letter accompanying the order, 
Judge Anthony J. Sciuto stated: 
Why should this court, or any court, fear to tread into an area of advanced technology? To permit the plaintiff to 
testify via Real Time Video teleconferencing will enable the plaintiff to have the benefit of viewing the trial, and 
testify live via the Internet where he would otherwise not be present in court due to his medical condition. . . . 
Permitting this plaintiff to view the trial and testify via the Internet clearly supports our Court's public policy to 
permit handicapped individuals access to our courts. This, in my opinion, is an essential and appropriate step for 
modern technology to assist in permitting all people equal access to justice. (85) 
The plaintiff did testify via the Internet and the case was settled after that testimony. The same technology permits 
broader access by the public to trials than ever before. (86) 
The assumption that lawyers might be especially reluctant to appear via video appears questionable. The Ninth 
Judicial Circuit of Minnesota is currently engaged in a pilot videoconferencing project. All courthouses in this large 
and predominately rural circuit are linked on a T-1 network, and use of videoconferencing is encouraged in civil 
cases (court rules forbid the use in juvenile and criminal proceedings). Judge James R. Wilson notes that he finds 
videoconferencing very beneficial and would like to see the restrictions on its use lifted in his circuit. He also notes 
that attorneys have embraced it because it was not at all uncommon for them to travel three hundred miles for 
appearances. There have even been proceedings in which participants have appeared from three remote 
locations. Judge Wilson does point out one drawback. Some attorneys in his circuit want to appear via 
videoconferencing for every matter and accommodating their remote appearance in a simple matter can take 
more time (for setting up and shutting down equipment) than a physical appearance in court would. (87)  
Remote appearances and testimony are the key elements in "virtual trials" and "virtual courtrooms." That we are 
likely to proceed further in these directions might also be extrapolated from the Florida Supreme Court's decision 
in Harrell: 
Our Court is mindful of the importance of today's decision. Yet, we are also mindful that our society, and indeed 
the world, is in the midst of the Information Age. Computers are the norm in American households and 
businesses; an infinite amount of information is available at our fingertips through the Internet; and satellite 
technology allows us to travel the world without ever leaving our living rooms.  
The legal profession has also benefitted from these technological innovations. Legal research that once took 
hours or days is now available in seconds through computer and Internet databases. Clients can reach their 
attorneys anywhere in the world through the use of cellular and video innovations. The list goes on and on.  
Indeed, our very own Court takes pride in the recent technological advancements that have been made. Oral 
arguments before the Court are broadcast live via satellite throughout the state. These same arguments can be 
viewed online, along with the parties' briefs. The Florida Supreme Court Website has received worldwide acclaim 
for opening up the courthouse doors to the general public. All of these steps provide greater access to the judicial 
system, which in turn increases public trust and awareness.  
That being said, it becomes quite clear that the courtrooms of this state cannot sit idly by, in a cocoon of 
yesteryear, while society and technology race towards the next millennium. Fortunately, the courtrooms of this 
state have not been idle, nor are they speeding at a reckless pace. Recent changes in the courtroom have 
included the use of audiotape stenographers as well as video transmission of first appearances, arraignments, 
and appellate oral arguments, just to name a few.  
We recognize that there are generally costs associated with change. Nevertheless, technological changes in the 
courtroom cannot come at the expense of the basic individual rights and freedoms secured by our constitutions. 
We are confident that the procedure approved today, when properly administered, will advance both the access to 
and the efficiency of the justice system, without compromising the expectation of the safeguards that are secured 
to criminal defendants.  
Our nation's Constitution is a living document that has stood the test of time and change. This point is exemplified 
by the fact that our Constitution is still viable today--some two hundred-plus years after our country's birth. There 
was no way the founders of this nation could have foreseen the innovations that would take place throughout our 
country's lifetime--changes that, up to this point, have included advances in communication, electricity, train, 
airplane, and automobile transportation, and even space exploration. Nor can we predict today the changes yet to 
come. But we can say with certainty that our Constitution, as well as this great nation, can endure any future 
changes while at the same time ensuring that individual rights and liberties will be upheld. (88)  
 
The Integrated High Technology Courtroom 
Introduction and Definition 
Thus far, we have reviewed many of the courtroom technologies that already are taking hold in our legal system. 
The whole is at least the sum of its parts, and sometimes the whole is different, and perhaps even greater. 
Accordingly, we now turn to what happens when these disparate technologies are brought together in today's 
integrated high technology courtrooms. 
All true high technology courtrooms are characterized by one core capability, a multi-faceted, technology-based 
evidence presentation system. Ordinarily, such a system will consist of at least a television-based document 
camera and a display system able to display not only what is placed under the camera but also, and critically, 
computer output. The computer input may stem from one or more installed desktop units, from a notebook 
computer supplied by counsel and connected temporarily to the display system, or a combination thereof. The 
display system may consist of televisions, computer monitors, or large front or rear projection systems. Usually a 
combination is used. An evidence display system does not alone create a true high technology courtroom, 
however. 
The Courtroom 21 Project definition of a high technology courtroom also requires a high technology court record 
system and the capability for remote witness testimony by two-way, high-quality videoconferencing. In the past, 
the Courtroom 21 definition assumed at least significant computer-based research and information retrieval 
capabilities from the bench. That is now part of the Project's formal definition as well. 
In short, today's high technology courtroom is the hub of a substantial amount of electronic information 
interchange. Although not yet a true virtual courtroom, it is apparent that key aspects of a virtual courtroom are 
present in the current high tech courtroom. The use and effects of the electronic information exchange that 
characterize even today's technology augmented courtrooms raise substantial questions, all of which would also 
accompany any discussion of virtual trials and virtual courtrooms. 
Troubling Questions 
Any evaluation of today's high tech facilities necessarily raise the following questions: 
z Do they work?  
z Do they improve the administration of justice?  
z What is necessary to create and operate these facilities?  
z To what extent, if at all, do they disadvantage some parties, counsel, or others?  
z What are the collateral consequences of high technology litigation?  
z Are technology augmented litigation and high technology courtrooms consistent with traditional humanistic 
goals?  
These are far from unimportant matters; our future depends upon their answers. Deeply concerned about the 
direction that our legal systems are traveling, largely without planning, in September, 1998, the Courtroom 21 
Project, with the support of the William &amp; Mary Bill of Rights Institute and the American Bar Association 
Sections on Litigation and Criminal Justice, conducted an international Working Conference on Technology 
Augmented Litigation. The threshold question to be considered was whether large scale technology use at trial 
was desirable or hurtful. Attended by judges, lawyers, administrators, support professionals, and experts in the 
area, the Working Conference concluded that:  
z The adoption of courtroom technology was ongoing and likely unstoppable;  
z Courtroom technology was desirable;  
z Known problems involving electronic incompatibility of evidentiary files required resolution through creation 
or adoption of standards;  
z It is too early in the adoption of technology to attempt to regulate its use in any thorough fashion but that 
liberal use of pretrial notice and disclosure is at least helpful in avoiding problems.  
Upon the unanimous request of the attendees a follow-on meeting has been scheduled for March, 2000. The 
Working Conference's conclusions support continued use of technology, but emphasize critical questions 
concerning high technology courtrooms. 
Do they work? 
The technologies, and the courtrooms that use them, work and generally work well. Indeed there is an amazing 
amount of interest in obtaining these technological capabilities throughout the United States and much of the 
world. This is not to say that specific technologies or products do not sometimes present difficulties. In general, 
however, the technologies work. Further, although careful scientific studies are necessary to validate these 
conclusions, it appears clear that technology use can, and often does, improve administrative efficiency, shorten 
trials, and improve fact-finder comprehension of evidence. Insofar as we can tell, however, courtroom technology 
is not itself sufficient to overcome inadequate evidence. Indeed, we suspect that all technology does for an 
inadequate lawyer is make that inadequacy even plainer. 
But, potential technological success is not the same as real success. Anecdotal evidence and internal experience 
gathered by the Courtroom 21 Project before and during the Working Conference predictably yielded the perhaps 
obvious, but none the less sobering, conclusion that most lawyers are disinclined to use courtroom technology. 
Insofar as we can tell, the high tech courtrooms that are the most successful are those in which judges have not 
only provided training for the lawyers, but also required that counsel use the technology on a mandatory basis. 
From our interviews and inquiries we conclude that successful high tech courtrooms require that their judges be 
enthusiasts. Bench-bar partnerships are also essential for success, but it is unclear whether they are sufficient. 
We are now seeing the first law school students for whom computer use is routine and self-evident. We would 
have thought that such familiarity and expertise would be sufficient to result in a desire to use courtroom 
technology. Although that has helped, it too has not been sufficient. 
Beginning with the Class of 1999, the William &amp; Mary Law School added mandatory courtroom technology 
training to the Legal Skills curriculum, effectively making it a graduation requirement. As a result of small group 
hands-on instruction during the 1997-98 academic year, we found that the optional use of our courtroom 
technology during student trials went up sharply. We initially concluded that small group hands-on instruction was 
the key to increased technology comfort and use. This seemed quite logical: once student lawyers overcame their 
lack of familiarity and possible unease and discovered how simple technology use could be, we expected, and 
received, sufficient quantitative improvements in use. Unfortunately, it appears that the situation is more 
complicated than originally presumed. Many of those same students are now taking elective Trial Advocacy 
during which they must try jury trials in front of a sitting federal or state judge. There is less use of the Courtroom's 
technology in those trials than we would have expected. It may be that the determining factor is that the faculty 
teaching the course seldom use the technology, (89) but we had anticipated greater motivation on the part of the 
students. 
The training situation is still more complicated. At present, a number of high technology courtrooms such as that of
United States District Judge Donald Walter supply counsel with orientation training. That training is 
understandably short and primarily oriented towards equipment operation. The Courtroom 21 Project-preferred 
litigator training curriculum takes about twelve hours, covers a wide range of associated topics, and integrates 
equipment operation into trial practice instruction. As observed by Susan Hobbs, Courtroom 21 Project Associate 
Director for Research &amp; Publications, (90) if courts or firms suggest that more than a few minutes of hand-on 
training is necessary to profitably use high tech evidence presentation options, a major time and psychological 
barrier to such use may be erected. At the same time, supplying only a few minutes of training erroneously and 
misleadingly suggests that that is all that is truly necessary. 
We conclude that lawyer willingness to use courtroom technology may be the determining factor in its success. 
(91) Such willingness may not remain a problem, however. Setting aside those situations in which the court 
mandates such use, thereby resolving the problem, increased recognition of the value of the technology for 
winning one's case is likely to impel its adoption by lawyers. If nothing else, the adversary system should drive 
adoption as counsel increasingly will be afraid that failure to use technology when one's opponent may do so is an
unacceptable risk.  
Improving the administration of justice 
What "improves" the administration of justice is clearly a question of judgment. Initially, decreasing the time and 
cost necessary to resolve a dispute would appear to be in the interests of judgment. So too should be 
improvement in fact finder comprehension which should lead to improved accuracy in result. Assuming that these 
results do in fact flow from the use of courtroom technology, (92) problems may yet remain. Most civil or criminal 
cases are resolved by settlement. At least in the abstract it is possible that decreasing the cost and delay now 
inherent in adjudication in most jurisdictions could be counter-productive. On one hand, some degree of delay is 
probably necessary for many litigants so that they can recover from the initial emotional commitment to their 
ultimate goals and achieve a somewhat greater degree of detachment, permitting a more realistic case appraisal. 
(93) On the other hand, current delay and cost themselves impel settlement. If barriers to trial are lightened it may 
be that more cases will go to trial. This, of course, is not necessarily bad -- "Justice delayed is justice denied." If 
we are now discouraging meritorious cases from trial, we should eagerly embrace increased efficiency even if it 
causes an increased caseload.  
Technology-augmented litigation has been embraced by many trial lawyers largely because the lawyers believe 
that it enhances their ability to persuade juries. Although we ought to prize and encourage anything that enhances 
fact finding accuracy, we should be deeply concerned about any technique that increases the risk of a verdict 
justified more on emotion than fact. At present there is reason to believe that technology creates special risks of 
such an unacceptable result. However, further experimental work - and monitoring of real cases - in this area 
would be desirable.  
What is necessary to create and operate these facilities?  
Creation of high technology courtrooms requires: 
z careful systems analysis, including candid evaluation of the way that trials are conducted in that court  
z courtroom-specific design  
z technology acquisition  
z installation  
z operation  
z training  
z maintenance.  
Although adequate funding is obviously necessary, the primary expense in installing these facilities is for the 
actual wiring -- which can be very costly if the wiring must be retrofitted into an existing, historical facility. When 
properly designed, maintenance should not be significant; courtroom technology should be straightforward and 
unlikely to fail 
Some form of maintenance is clearly necessary. Normal maintenance is likely to consist of such things as 
adjusting monitors and correcting altered switch settings or finding where someone has unplugged equipment. If a 
monitor fails, someone must be able to replace it with a spare. More sophisticated maintenance, perhaps including
an outside maintenance contract, is necessary for less likely but more serious failures. (94) 
Operation and training are hard to quantify. When designed pursuant to the Courtroom 21 Project's requirement of
simplicity, the courtroom should be subject to operation by judge (95) or deputy clerk; no special expert should be 
needed. Training, however, is likely to be an ongoing necessity in the short term. That responsibility must either be
transferred to the bar or institutionalized in the courthouse staff. Any installation that requires new staff should be 
scrutinized carefully; high technology courtrooms should decrease costs, not increase them. 
To what extent, if at all, do they advantage or disadvantage some parties, counsel, or others? 
One of the most fundamental questions raised by technology augmented technology, and high technology 
courtrooms in particular, is whether they potentially disadvantage key participants in the process. The threshold 
question is whether the cost of equipment, and the case-specific preparation that requires office access to 
technology, effectively prohibits small firms, solo practitioners, and pro se litigants from technology use. Courtroom
technology potentially includes not only inexpensive straightforward methods of evidence presentation such as 
document cameras, but possibly costly document scanning, and almost certainly expensive methods such as 
computer animation production. Choosing to proceed via the expensive route is a gamble; even if the case is won 
the results may not justify expense. In 1995, for example, the California Court of Appeals vacated a jury's award of
costs to a prevailing party because it deemed "high-powered computer support" to not fall within the definition of 
litigation expense. (96) The court focused on a controversial aspect of high tech litigation, noting that "[i]f costs are 
routinely awarded for high-powered technology, most parties will be unable to litigate." (97) The goal, of course, is 
to make litigation affordable; certainly not more costly. But even the basics potentially cost money that a lawyer or 
litigant may not have. 
Ad hoc technology use raises the financial question squarely. If we assume that both parties to a trial have 
access, albeit distinctly uneven access, to trial technology the problem does not appear to be acute. Modern 
computer technology has gone a long way toward equalizing solo practitioners and large law firms. Although the 
imbalance remains substantial, it is far narrower than it was before technology. A solo practitioner with computer 
technology can conduct wide ranging research, prepare and file pleadings and motions, and prepare high 
technology evidence presentations and exhibits in a fashion incalculable a generation ago. In this circumstances, 
the differential in ability is arguably quantitative and not qualitative. Further, as United States District Court Judge 
Kathleen O'Malley has noted, many lawyers from small firms and solo practitioners are more computer-adept than 
lawyers at large firms because they have to rely on themselves and not consultants or support staff. (98) The real 
question is what happens when one party has technology and the other has no meaningful access. (99) 
An indigent client represented by a solo practitioner who is opposed by an affluent client who has retained a large 
firm is at a serious potential disadvantage if the large firm uses technology. Even if the large firm provides the 
courtroom technology and either voluntarily, or under judicial direction, permits technology use by the solo 
practitioner, the solo practitioner may lack either the training or the outside access to technology to permit effective
use. Of course, this is hardly a new dilemma. Unequal legal representation is a constant in our system, and terribly
mismatched counsel do not justify relief unless counsel for one party is legally inadequate. 
However, even if the mismatch of technology versus non-technology is simply a new form of a continuing systemic
deficiency, that does not in itself justify dismissing the problem. Once at trial the question of fairness really 
becomes one of equal access to courtroom technology. The institutional high technology courtroom is one answer 
to this dilemma. If all parties are supplied with a courtroom that comes complete with necessary technology rather 
than just a display system for evidence or presentations created by the litigant's own equipment, the technology 
imbalance is in large measure redressed. When the court provides a high tech forum it is also providing a level 
playing field. The only issues left are the lawyers' inclinations and know-how, and this is largely a matter of 
preparedness. Thus the question is raised, can lack of technology or the training or willingness to use it constitute 
"inadequacy"?  
Ethically and legally, a lawyer must be competent. The definition of competence is open to debate, but surely we 
can agree on some key points. For example, is a lawyer who cannot perform basic legal research "competent"? If 
not, are we fast approaching the day when a lawyer who cannot perform electronic research will not be 
competent? As our society becomes more technologically based, our definition of "competence" must adjust. 
Given such realities I believe that both law firms and law schools must consider how to deal with the impact of 
legal technology.  
At the most obvious level, I would argue that to be "competent," litigators must know what technological 
assistance is available to them and how to use it. (100)  
It seems unlikely that current standards would define an inability or refusal to use courtroom technology as ethical 
inadequacy or legal malpractice. But if courtroom technology continues its expansion into the court system it is 
increasingly likely that technological proficiency will be such a requirement. Of course, if technological prowess is 
not yet required, how can we expect the vast multitude of lawyers to cope with a virtual courtroom? The adversary 
system itself may be at least a partial answer. In a recent trial in Maryland, a defense attorney objected, 
unsuccessfully, to the prosecutor's use of a computer slide show during closing argument. He admitted to 
reporters that the enhanced closing argument made his own effort appear "slipshod in comparison." (101)  
Even if inability to use technology on the part of a lawyer does not constitute an ethical problem we are left with a 
sobering question of public policy. If technology assists a litigator, and thus the represented party, technology is at 
least a significant factor in representation. What happens when trial includes a pro se litigant who either has no 
ability to use technology or lacks the access to it? The Courtroom 21 Project approach has been to encourage 
courts to install basic evidence presentation systems, complete with computers, rather than to just provide 
connections for laptop computers to the display systems. The Project's rationale is that this affords the pro se 
litigant or solo, non-computer supported practitioner with at least the opportunity to present a case electronically. 
This position was ultimately supported by the Courtroom 21 Working Conference because it attempts to redress 
unequal access to justice. Unfortunately, although well intentioned, it is probable that the position is a makeweight 
with little practical value. Absent personal and continued access to technology it is unlikely that a litigant or 
practitioner will be able to successfully use even basic court-supplied technology. This is a qualitative difference 
and is, or should be, troubling. 
Although technology clearly has presented us with a sobering question of access, it has also brought blessings to 
those who suffer from hearing and other problems. The hard of hearing who can read can serve as jurors, 
counsel, and judge thanks to real-time transcription, including real-time displayed as closed captioning on motors. 
Infra-red systems help those who can hear, but not well. The degree to which technology can assist people with 
other concerns is unclear at present, but is it clear that substantial benefits are available. (102) The Courtroom 21 
Project recently added a medical doctor to its staff as Assistant Director for Adaptive Technologies and 
Ergonomics. It is our hope that research in this area will point the way to assisting many of those now 
disadvantaged.  
What are the collateral consequences of high technology litigation? 
One of the difficulties in evaluating the impact of high technology litigation and courtrooms is that their collateral 
effects are so unclear. We believe that when used properly technology can improve efficiency and save trial time. 
On occasion, however, the overall situation might be viewed as a balloon; press in at one point and some other 
location on the balloon will bulge out. It may be that the savings in trial time is offset by increased lawyer pretrial 
preparation. The cost savings at trial may be offset by the cost due to document scanning. We simply don't know 
enough about the overall economics involved. 
At the same time, human questions are pressing. If technology use is to be commonplace, how many lawyers and 
judges will be unable, or unwilling to adapt? Is the process of trying a case electronically different in important 
ways from traditional modes? When the Courtroom 21 Project conducted a two-day program for the ABA Litigation
Section's Trial Evidence Committee, a number of lawyers felt that document display on jury monitors created a 
form of psychological distance from those documents.  
Are technology-augmented litigation and high technology courtrooms consistent with traditional 
humanistic goals? 
Courts serve two primary functions in our society: they resolve disputes, (103) and, to the degree possible in a 
system conducted by fallible people, they deliver justice to litigants. Courts are preeminently human creations. 
People view the courts as places in which justice is administered by the people's agents. The normative model, 
accepted by most of the nation, (104) is a jury sitting as fact finder and verdict giver, a jury that applies judge 
explained law to the facts as determined by the jury. Trial lawyers apply their understanding of human psychology 
in an attempt to convince judges and jurors of their case interpretations; the judge and jury determine facts by 
filtering human evidence through their own experiences. Interestingly, courts have shown themselves hostile to 
non-blood typing/DNA probability evidence in part because it is thought to remove humanity from adjudication. 
(105) 
From the comments of visitors to the Courtroom 21 Project, the ultimate threat that technology-augmented 
litigation is thought to aim at the judicial system is loss of humanity. Traditional litigation places the lawyer at the 
focus of fact-finder attention. Papers are shown to human witnesses in the courtroom; charts are placed on 
easels, and lawyers add emotion to logic in closing arguments. Even the tribulations of the participants, hours 
wasted by waiting witnesses and inactive jurors, are classic human complaints. Verdicts themselves are 
sometimes the ultimate example of human conflict as jurors, sometimes literally "locked up" together, struggle to 
reach resolution, if only to terminate their forced togetherness. Enter technology- augmented litigation; enter the 
high technology courtroom. Evidence consists primarily of electronic images; counsel rarely leave the centralized 
litigators' podium or the counsel tables. Remote first appearances and arraignments, common in hundreds of 
courts, result in the accused seeing the judge who determines conditions of release and other critical factors by 
two-way television, perhaps leaving a nagging question in the mind of the accused: if they really cared, wouldn't 
they bring me there? Important testimony at trial is increasingly given by faces in televisions, albeit live interactive 
faces, and we are beginning to see more and more remote judges and counsel. Could it be that as we improve 
efficiency we risk minimizing the humanness that has characterized our trials? Absent experimental work that has 
yet to be conducted, we cannot even hazard a guess as to the reaction of jurors (106) or the general public. The 
views of the surveyed judges and of the attendees of the Courtroom 21 Project Working Conference on 
Technology-Augmented Litigation are quite positive about technology use. Conceding lack of sufficient 
experimental data in the area, we might posit the following: 
z technology use per se is not troublesome;  
z should technology use increase past an (unknown) point in any given case, jurors, observers and perhaps 
legal professionals may become uncomfortable;  
z if highly expansive technology use becomes sufficiently commonplace to penetrate the national 
consciousness, the courts might lose the degree of general acceptance that currently results in acceptance 
of most verdicts, if the changing and increasing nature of national technology use does not itself change 
general societal expectations.  
Assuming the above, it is now appropriate to turn to what may well be the next major step in high technology 
litigation and courtroom: virtual trials. 
Tomorrow's Possible Virtual Courtrooms 
Inasmuch as no true "virtual courtroom" exists as yet, one can define the concept with an unusual degree of 
liberty. We will assume for purposes of this article that a true virtual courtroom is not a physical location but rather 
is the interchange of high-quality audio, video, text, and graphical information among trial participants without 
concern, except for jurisdictional requirements, for the physical location of those participants. 
The beginning of Web-based interactive instruction makes it clear that a virtual court based upon exchange of text
(107) is now possible. Indeed, David Johnson, founder of Counsel Connect, has proposed resolution of certain 
disputes entirely via the Internet. (108) We assume that this type of information exchange is per se insufficient as 
a substitute for the traditional form of courtroom adjudication. This is based upon the assumption that most people 
would reject as inaccurate or unjust decision making that is not accompanied by contemporaneous viewing of 
witnesses, jurors, counsel, and judge. (109) Certainly, the commercial rush to incorporate audio and video into the 
Internet suggests the importance of those communication components. 
Given our assumption that live video is necessary, we will define a true virtual courtroom as one in which all of the 
participants can be in different physical locations. All trial components, including opening statements, evidence, 
closing arguments, instructions, and jury deliberations occur via electronic information exchange. The courtroom 
itself exists only in the data exchange network. The true virtual courtroom is, therefore, a cyber courtroom. 
The true, "virtual courtroom" would be a courtroom in which participants, all of whom might be located physically 
elsewhere, would appear together electronically with each one perceiving the other, and the courtroom, as if they 
were all in the same physical location. This concept is not a new one - at least in the world of science fiction. Many
American television viewers would think quickly of the Enterprise's "holodeck" in the various Star Trek series. 
Such a concept has more reality than one might expect. Virtual reality now exists via "CAVE," Cave Automated 
Virtual Environment. "A CAVE is about the size of a walk-in closet. Step inside, put on 3-D glasses, and suddenly 
you become part of a computer animation . . . (110) "There are more than 100 CAVEs at universities, government 
facilities, and companies . . . . They help engineers see 3-D full-size models of cars and enable scientists to walk 
inside models of single molecules." (111) This would yield a courtroom that exists only in a data network, but one 
which to all human senses, and thus psychologically, would be experienced as a physical courtroom with all 
participants present. Such a courtroom exists only in science fiction, however, - at least for the mid-term future. 
Today's virtual cyber courtrooms must be far more limited in scope. They will permit participants to share the 
litigation information and to intercommunicate, all while remaining physically distant. This defines today's virtual 
courtroom. 
Technology: How Close To a Useful Virtual Courtroom Are We? 
Our review of the now existing courtroom technologies leads to the unavoidable conclusion that all of the 
technological pieces necessary to create a virtual courtroom are either in use now or can be expected to be 
commercially available in the immediate future. To the degree that a significant technology question exists, it 
concerns the switching and distribution system that would be necessary to "construct" or "carry" a virtual 
courtroom. Positing a set-up in which all participants can view each other and the evidence requires a system that 
can receive those images and distribute them as constrained by evidentiary and procedural rules. At present the 
Internet would be the obvious mechanism, with the "courthouse" acting as central control. An Internet-based 
system would also answer the need for a "public" trial; even today, huge numbers of people can concurrently view 
a given Web site. However, today's normal Internet access provides insufficient bandwidth to carry sufficiently 
high quality video, to say nothing of the many different images required. At the same time, rapidly improving 
Internet access, including the new Internet II, suggest that the bandwidth issue is only a matter of time. 
The technology problem is not the theoretical availability of specific mechanisms which, combined, could create a 
virtual courtroom. The real problem is the limited access to the technology. Our legal system exists for all people, 
and we cannot and must not exclude from it those who lack the financial means to afford personal technology or 
those who for a variety of reasons cannot use technology. A true virtual courtroom presupposes easy access by 
all potential trial participants, including jurors. Although technology is sweeping the United States, such ubiquitous 
technology access seems unlikely, if not impossible, any time in the near or intermediate future, at least for jury 
trials.  
To define the virtual courtroom in such a purist fashion as to define it out of existence is to go to far, however. The 
core of the problem is the jury. The goal of having every participant appear remotely from a location of that 
person's choosing, is simply not likely to be practical any time soon. But, a partial virtual trial could be 
accommodated and a virtual courtroom created if the jury were to be required to meet in person; or if jurors 
needing technology support could report to local courthouses (112) for an electronic connection to the 
proceedings.  
This discussion has been focused thus far on jury trials. Although a jury trial is the normative rule in the United 
States, most of our cases are not jury trials; they are bench trials of varying importance. Freed of a need for a jury,
virtual trials and courtrooms become much easier to institute. 
Bench trials, including traffic court and administrative proceedings 
Most trials and hearings in the United States are without juries. Administrative, civil, or criminal, they are 
characterized by judge, counsel, witnesses, parties, and associated court personnel and support staff. Although 
perhaps distressing to some members of the bar, attorneys could be required to use remote appearance facilities. 
Witnesses and parties could appear either from their own remote, camera-equipped computers, or use public 
terminals located in high traffic areas such as shopping malls. In some administrative cases, the claimant may 
even be the only witness. In the simplest criminal case, that of minor traffic infractions, a virtual courtroom would 
be easy to create and likely would be regarded as a blessing by most. Rather than having to take substantial time 
from work or other pursuits to challenge a traffic ticket, defendants could use remote equipment to do so. Police 
officers could appear remotely from their station or other appropriate location. Given its electronic nature and the 
probable lack of the need for a text- based transcript, electronic recording of the proceeding would make a 
sufficient record. In the event of conviction and sentence, fines could be paid by electronic funds transfer or credit 
card. The same would appear to be equally true of the equivalent of small claims court or any other relatively 
straightforward proceeding. Criminal cases in which incarceration is a possible sentence present obvious 
problems: jailing a virtual image of a convicted defendant is hardly likely to be satisfactory. 
Appellate courts 
Creation of a virtual appellate courtroom and trial of a virtual appeal present no significant problems and could be 
readily done today. Use of a multi-point videoconference would suffice today; creation of a multi-participant system
in which all parties could see each other at all times would require a more sophisticated electronic structure, and a 
more expensive one if high-quality video were required, but that too is possible. Further, as is true of the 
Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothin Courtroom, such a virtual facility would also permit interchange of electronic 
legal authority, including briefs or components thereof. In short, a virtual appellate courtroom is readily possible, 
and as we create facilities in which one or more of the participants appear by videoconferencing we are now 
experimenting across the world with the first, limited, versions of one. 
Other Technology Problems 
It is a rare visit to the Courtroom 21 Project that fails to brings up the question of electronic security. Ordinarily 
such a concern raises two different matters: the risk of digital alteration or fabrication, already addressed, and the 
possibility of electronic eavesdropping, up to and including penetration and alteration of the court's electronic 
records. Electronic eavesdropping is theoretically possible and in some high profile cases must be considered to 
be a meaningful threat, just as "hacking" is an ever present risk to every network, even if it is only intended as a 
prank. It seems unlikely that this is a threat that cannot be dealt with adequately by careful system design. 
Technologists have learned a great deal about physical and data security. Those lessons and common sense 
should be sufficient -- if implemented. 
Legal Problems 
State constitutions, federal and state statutes, and court rules all potentially limit or prohibit virtual trials. All of 
these can be amended, however. The most difficult source of applicable law to amend is obviously the United 
States Constitution, and accordingly a cursory legal review should focus on that. 
Any virtual trial will engender at the very least all of the current problems usually associated with high technology 
courtrooms. If remote testimony by a prosecution witness implicates Sixth Amendment confrontation concerns 
now, a trial in which all government testimony were to be electronic and remote would obviously pose a more 
demanding problem. 
At least two other constitutional problems are immediately apparent, however. Under the United States 
constitution all trials are public trials, with closure permitted in only narrow circumstances. (113) How can a virtual 
trial be "public"? Presumably, the public receives access through the ability to view the proceeding electronically 
as it takes place. If a limited original intent/textual interpretation is applied, this may be inadequate, especially if 
not everyone has the means for easy and free electronic access. Critically, however, the traditional right to view a 
trial has never required the government to enable the public to travel to the courthouse. Similarly, today's 
courthouses do not promise sufficient space for all interested attendees, first-come, first- served is usually the 
practice. Accordingly, if remote public access is sufficient under the Constitution, there is no current reason why all
interested observers must have access. 
At an equally fundamental level is the question of the meaning of the right to a jury trial. Section 1 of Article III of 
the Constitution provides that, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury . . . ." 
The Seventh Amendment specifies that "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ." As it appears certain that a "jury"consisting of 
individuals who do not hear the evidence clustered physically together and, more importantly, do not deliberate 
together physically is potentially very different psychologically from a traditional jury, it may be that the Constitution
would block virtual juries absent waiver by the appropriate parties. Similarly, "due process" is sufficiently vague 
that the Court could decide that it prohibits involuntary virtual proceedings.  
Human and Systemic Questions 
Ultimately, all of the critical questions that grow out of adjudication are human ones. We can assume technological
adequacy, sufficient funds for equipment purchase, maintenance, and operation, but we cannot assume sufficient 
human access, training, or acceptance. We can cope in a variety of ways with access and operation (training). 
Acceptance is another matter. 
Courthouses have long been considered important if not key pieces of public architecture. They help supply a 
sense of solidity. They often convey the role of law in American life. Federal courthouses, designed in past years 
sometimes to include post office facilities, often are the primary representative of the national government. 
Courtrooms, the center of courthouses, embody the administration of justice. (114) As William Gossett observed, 
"If respect for the courts and for their judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a 
society." (115)Virtual courtrooms and virtual trials threaten that sense of place and solemnity. What might virtual 
courtroom justice mean to the people? 
On the one hand, justice ought to be a real, rather than just a theoretical, right of every person. As the late 
Learned Hand observed, "If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandant: Thou shalt not ration 
justice." (116) Our imperative must be to increase justice; not decrease it. If we can make the right to justice more 
meaningful for those who, faced with the demands of work, family, or limited mobility, cannot easily get to the 
courthouse (117)for what is often a brief hearing, justice would be augmented. Yet, on the other hand, American 
respect for law and justice, diminished as it sometimes seems to be, (118) might well suffer if the public should 
perceive that the process was not fair. Potential deficiencies include not only possible perceived deficiencies in the
truth-finding process, e.g. a doubt either that remote witnesses will tell the truth or that jurors can accurately 
evaluate the testimony of such a witness, but also the risk that the adjudicative system could be seen as no longer
human-oriented. I assume that public compliance with legislated societal rules and acceptance of court verdicts 
requires at the very least a general perception that justice is done, usually, by the courts. (119) If the public 
perceives that justice is not done, whether because of result or process, that general consensus would fail. Even a
cursory glance abroad makes it clear that the American adversary system is not the sole process that can 
command general societal acceptance as a fair adjudicative process. Too many other nations have broadly 
satisfied populations despite significant and sometimes radically different dispute resolution systems. Yet, the 
nature of what is acceptable in a legal system is clearly linked to national culture. The legal system in the United 
States is oriented around the concept of a trial in which the accuser/plaintiff presents evidence in open court in the 
presence of and subject to searching inquiry by the defense in a process kept reasonably fair by a neutral judge 
and resolved, by human beings, judge or jury. The Anglo-American system has rejected adjudications conducted 
on the basis of dossiers, creating a hearsay rule that, however riddled with exceptions, creates an institutional 
preference for live, in-court, testimony on all sides. It is very much unclear at present whether our population is 
prepared to interpret live, electronically conveyed, testimony and related evidence as the human equivalent of in-
court testimony. If it is not yet willing to do so, a true virtual trial will be viewed with great suspicion.  
We ought not, however, be overly-wedded to current courtroom assumptions. As Chief Justice Burger observed in 
a different context, "We should get away from the idea that a court is the only place in which to settle disputes. 
People with claims are likely people with pains. They want results and they don't care whether it's in a courtroom 
with lawyers and judges, or somewhere else. (120) 
It is impossible to predict how this or any other nation will react to a virtual courtroom at a future time when 
telecommuting, virtual offices and libraries, and the like have become commonplace. Presumably, when 
adjudication uses the same methods employed in the day-to-day activities by most of the populace, those 
methods will not be viewed with suspicion. Until then, virtual courtrooms must be viewed with great caution. Of 
course, given the current rate of technological change, it may not be long before elements of the public find the 
lack of virtual courtrooms to be a visible sign of the law's innate and undesirable conservatism. 
So, Where Does This Road Go, After All? 
Even the most cursory review of the legal technologies now finding homes in the new, integrated high technology 
courtrooms leads one to conclude that virtual courtrooms are not idle speculation. Insofar as the public and media 
are concerned, critical components of a number of different types of court proceedings are already virtual. The 
direct and cross-examination of the Argentine complainants via satellite-transmitted two-way video in the Harrell 
case (121) was in many respects a virtual trial. That testimony was the critical and core prosecution evidence in 
the case. True, the rest of the trial participants were in the Florida courtroom, but the core was not there. Had the 
defendant been excluded from the courtroom for misbehavior, for example, and viewed both the Argentine 
testimony and the courtroom remotely, the virtual trial descriptor would become even more convincing. 
As our high technology courtrooms increasingly become technology hubs, and the centers of massive electronic 
data interchange, we will get ever closer to true virtual courtrooms and virtual trials. It has long been a Courtroom 
21 Project truism, however, that just because we can do something is not itself a justification to actually do it. By 
eliminating travel, document transmission delay, and evidence presentation inefficiencies, virtual courtrooms could
save a great deal of money and time, for all of those involved in trial. They could make trials truly public if any 
member of the public who wished could "log in" to a trial. And, by making public all of the case evidence, the 
media could be expected to improve its reporting. (122) These substantial improvements in operational efficiency 
and access are counterbalanced by the risk of the loss of public acceptance of trials as fair and accurate dispute 
resolution devices - if the public is unready to accept virtual courtrooms. 
The ongoing adoption of courtroom technology is such that we can expect massive systemic change over the next
ten years. Insofar as we can tell at the Courtroom 21 Project, that change is largely unstoppable, a conclusion 
accepted by the Courtroom 21 Working Conference on Technology Augmented Litigation. The sea change we are 
now undergoing will bring an increasing degree of "virtualism" to our courtrooms and trials. Whether we should in 
the short term endeavor to create virtual courtrooms for more than experimental purposes is another matter. 
If we are correct and the technologies that will permit true virtual courtrooms are already here in substance, the 
real question is one of total integrated use. As we continue down our legal information highway, the road will 
increasingly be affected by technology. Remote appearances (123) will increase, and the use of electronic based 
fact-finding will become commonplace. We will have the option of taking a number of early highway forks that 
would lead us directly and rapidly to virtual courtrooms. The main highway is likely ultimately to take us to the 
same destination, but perhaps many years later. Which if any of the forks should we take? 
If we are correct in our supposition that full virtual civil and criminal trials would threaten in the short term the 
somewhat uneasy national consensus that most American trials are reasonably accurate, fair, and just, we ought 
to use virtual courtrooms and trials for those areas in which the public would perceive an improvement in fairness 
and justice. Proceedings in which the public's ability to participate meaningfully is enhanced by virtual proceedings
should be welcomed. The move to kiosk and Internet based legal information delivery and limited court services 
points the way. If traffic court and similar proceedings, including the vast number of administrative benefit 
application hearings can be made easier for the public with a perceived improvement in access and fairness, 
virtual courtrooms and hearing rooms will be accepted as valued improvements to the national adjudicative 
processes. Such courtrooms should begin as voluntary alternative means to current adjudication. As acceptance 
increases and the nation moves to even more technology use, we can expect greater use and dependence upon 
virtual courtrooms. 
We are on the road to the virtual courtroom. Unless we take an intentional early exit elsewhere, our final 
destination is clear. The virtual courtroom is unlikely to replace in the near future our hallowed wood- or marble-
paneled inner sanctums, but even those traditional places of law and judgment will see increasing amounts of 
virtual evidence and adjudication. We have the opportunity, as we travel, however, to build some high technology 
side roads leading to specialized virtual hearing rooms and courtrooms. As we travel on the main highway, 
though, we travel with the near certain probability that for many types of cases and in many types of courts and 
tribunals our eventual destination will be the virtual courtroom.  
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